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Abstract
Cloud computing is one of the most important advances in computing in recent history. cybercrime has
developed side by side and rapidly in recent years. Previous studies had confirmed the existing gap
between cloud service providers (CSPs) and law enforcement agencies (LEAs), and LEAs cannot work
without the cooperation of CSPs. Their relationship is influenced by legal, organisational and technical
dimensions, which affect the investigations. Therefore, it is essential to enhance the cloud forensics
relationship between LEAs and CSPs. This research addresses the need for a unified collaborative model
to facilitate proper investigations and explore and evaluate existing different models involved in the
relationship between Omani LEAs and local CSPs as a participant in investigations. Further, it proposes
a validated research instrument that can be cloud forensics survey. It can also be used as an evaluation
tool to identify, measure, and manage cloud forensic investigations.
Keywords Cloud Forensics, Incident Response, Law Enforcement Agents, Cloud Service Providers,
Cloud Forensics Readiness, construct, instrument, survey, reliability, validity.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has become a revolution in the technology world, and both individuals and institutions
are using cloud services and becoming dependent on it. By replacing old systems to cloud services,
organisations can save time and cost (Al-Gharibi 2019b). Gartner expects cloud services to exceed $300
billion by 2021 (Gartner 2018). Governments are now turning to the application of cloud computing for
the delivery of their systems and services. Due to this emerging technology, most of the current digital
crime forensic cases have moved from local device storage to the cloud, including smart devices
connected to cloud environments. The result of this change is seen in the daunting challenges that Law
Enforcement faces when conducting investigations involving data stored in the cloud. Hence, Digital
Forensics (DF) had a new specialisation named as "Cloud Forensics (CF)”.
The challenges have become bigger for law enforcement with cloud forensics investigations, where LEAs
cannot work without the cooperation of CSPs. The relationship between LEAs and CSPs is overwhelmed
by many challenges, in the legal, organisational and technical levels, which negatively affect the
cooperation between the two organisations (Al Husaini 2018b; Dykstra 2013; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016;
NIST 2014; Ruan & Carthy 2012; Ruan et al. 2013; Ruan et al. 2011)
This problem is not trivial because LEAs cannot work without the cooperation of CSPs. Their
relationship does not have one challenge that can be addressed solely by organisational level, in facts,
the organisational, legal and technical challenges are interlinked. Based on the literature review, there
is no previous studies on this relationship. For this reason, this study focuses on the current situation of
cloud forensics in Oman as a case study and seek to understand the existing relationship between Omani
LEAs and local CSPs by answering the research question: What are the factors that impact upon the
relationship between Omani LEAs and local CSPs?
A survey is designed to contribute in answering the research question, this paper aims is to propose a
validated research instrument for this survey. It can also be used as an evaluation tool to identify,
measure, and manage cloud forensics investigations relationship. Implications of the study suggest a
need for rigorous research to understand this relationship and how it affects the path of real-world
digital forensic cases.
The remaining of this paper subsections cover a literature review of cloud, digital forensics, digital
forensics in Oman and cloud forensics. In section two we introduce and discuss existing Cloud Forensics
Readiness (CFR) models and relevant standards and, in section three we explore the conceptual
framework and hypotheses. Section four discusses the research methodology, and finally, we share the
result and conclusions.

1.1 Digital Forensics
The prime purpose of Digital Forensics is to facilitate the reconstruction of events and actions which are
found to be criminal or helping to anticipate any malicious actions shown to be troublesome to planned
operations. Therefore, the credibility of digital evidence is at the core of the digital forensic process
because it is the means by which a forensic conclusion is either accepted or rejected (Selamat, Yusof &
Sahib 2008).
Despite many assertions by researchers about the importance of an international standard for digital
forensics (Al Husaini 2018a; Du, Le-Khac & Scanlon 2017; Kohn, Eloff & Eloff 2013; Reith, Carr &
Gunsch 2002), there are several standards such as the ISO standards(ISO 27037 2012; ISO/27043 2015)
academic, UK and US standards (UK: Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide
for Digital Evidence(Williams 2012), US: “Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First
Responders”(Ballou 2010))
However, these are generic guidelines to deal with digital evidence and each suggests different phases
and processes, which leads to the different countries develop their own operational level to comply with
local procedures, policies, and principles in a given country.

1.2 Digital Forensics in OMAN
Oman established the National Digital Forensics Lab (NDFL), which was opened in February 2016
(MuscatDaily 2016; Times_Of_Oman 2016). One year later in 2017, it obtained international
accreditation by the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board (ANAB). This laboratory is used to collect
evidence and to assist LEAs and judicial authorities with investigating these crimes.
In Oman, more than 2,800 phone calls and over 420 e-mails were registered to report about cybercrimes
by the end of 2016, which required the intervention of the NDFL. In 2017, the NDFL handled 172 DF
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cases involving 877 evidence devices including computers, mobile, phones, external hard disk and USBs,
which resulted from cybercrime cases in Oman (Ras & Venter 2015).

1.3 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing cannot be considered a new technological term, but just in 2007 only cloud computing
was introduced to the public, after the announcement of Google and IBM cooperation in cloud
technologies (A Vouk 2008; Alenezi et al. 2017). Gartner predicts cloud services around the world to
grow in 2018 to more than $ 186 billion, an increase of 21.4 per cent from 2017, as it is expected to
exceed $ 300 billion by 2021 (Gartner 2018). Cloud computing has been defended by NIST as “Model
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell &
Grance 2011).
Despite all the benefits of cloud computing, shifting to the cloud is a challenge and the cloud computing
invite vulnerabilities that can be used in cybercrime (Al-Gharibi 2018). Although there are security risks
involved, the public and private sectors have chosen to adopt cloud computing. For example, in
government, they approach cloud services implementation. These include commercial cloud services,
government cloud services developed by the government, and government cloud services developed by
private companies (Al-Gharibi 2019a).

1.4 Cloud Forensics
Previous researchers have published numerous papers on cloud forensic with great interest in cloud
computing. However, despite all this research, no solutions were found to address the cloud forensics
challenges (Zhao & Duncan 2018).
Many researchers argue that the challenges of cloud forensics cannot be solved through technology alone
because there are regulatory and legal principles that must be solved side by side (De Marco 2015).
Numerous challenges that need to be solved in all these areas, many academic, technical, regulatory and
legal researchers have begun to discuss these challenges, such as trustworthiness, acountablity, and
Lack of international agreements & laws (Al Husaini 2018c; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Mell & Grance
2014).
The term of the cloud forensics is relatively new. The first researcher presented this term in 2011 (Ruan
et al. 2011) (Alenezi et al. 2017), who introduced organisational, technical and legal cloud forensics
challenges. NIST has defended cloud computing as "Cloud computing forensics science is the application
of scientific principles, technological practices and derived and proven methods to reconstruct past
cloud computing events through identification, collection, preservation, examination, interpretation
and reporting of digital evidence" (Mell & Grance 2014).

2 PREVIOUS STUDIES
Cloud forensics readiness has been well studied by many researchers (Ab Rahman et al. 2016; Alenezi
et al. 2017; Elyas et al. 2014; Grobler, Louwrens & von Solms 2010; ISO/27043 2015; Kebande & Venter
2014; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Makutsoane & Leonard 2014; Moussa, Ithnin & Miaikil 2014; NIST
2014; Sibiya et al. 2013; Trenwith & Venter 2013; Valjarevic & Venter 2013). A theoretical framework
was proposed with some suggested technical solutions which will be reviewed below:
The NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group (NCC FSWG)(Mell & Grance 2014) is one
of the most critical reports that highlight the challenges and problems of cloud forensics. However, the
report is relatively outdated, as the NCC FSWG has not issued any other report in this area, and it might
be due to the lack of financial support for the group. Yet it is the most detailed and comprehensive
comparison to other papers so far.
Another excellent report related to cloud forensic was published in 2016 by European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA), which came under the title "Exploring Cloud Incidents" It
provides an overview of the current state of cloud forensic and the incident response, and identifying
and analysing the current technical, legislative, organisational challenges (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016).
One of the CFR models is of interest by implementing a Botnet solution for monitoring the cloud
environment and providing acceptable digital evidence that can be used within the courts, which is
proposed by (Kebande & Venter 2014), yet this model needed to be standardised to integrate with other
cloud processes. Another forensics readiness model which could be used by CSPs as a technique for DFR,
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which can help CSPs to control evidence is required for investigations. However the range of this
framework is restricted to data examination in forensic analysis within the cloud infrastructure (Sibiya
et al. 2013).
Remote access / central to the investigator to the cloud computing it was one of the proposed models
for CFR by (Trenwith & Venter 2013), which could support digital forensics investigators to do their
work.
A conceptual model for immigrating the organisations to the cloud environment suggested by
(Makutsoane & Leonard 2014), the idea was to define the status of readiness of CSPs. The proposed
model, which involves a process tool, allows organisations to create the right decision and choose the
suitable CSP. Highlighting the requirements of cloud forensics, the authors used a non Malicious Botnet
to measure forensic readiness. Those suggested requirements include technical, operational and legal
aspects based on the (ISO/27043 2015) standard. Once again the requirements need to be ascertained
and tested to ensure the performance is not only effective but can be a standard to which all forensic
investigations are conducted and will continue to evolve with future technologies (Kebande & Venter
2016). A conceptual framework which is detected to help laaS users activate forensics readiness. The
framework shows how IaaS users can get potential digital evidence without depending on CSPs. This
model includes nine elements, containing the technical, legal and organisational forensics readiness core
values (Moussa, Ithnin & Miaikil 2014).
A forensics-by-design framework for Cyber-Physical Cloud Systems (CPCS) suggested by (Ab Rahman
et al. 2016), where they are highlighting the significance of forensic readiness. It contains six elements
and assures us that a CPCS can be intended for facilitating forensic investigations. This framework can
help investigators and accelerate forensic investigations. CFR framework by highlighting the factors
affecting CFR technical, legal and regulatory (Alenezi et al. 2017).
According to the previous literature review, there are concerns and lack of confidence that the CSPs will
be the first to respond to an incident. There is a consensus amongst researchers that there are gaps and
conflict of interest between CSPs and LEAs.
In this study, we will highlight the relationship between LEAs and CSPs and classify the essential factors
to be understood in order to enhance and organise the relationship.

3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
There is a broad consensus among researchers (Almulla, Iraqi & Jones 2014; Alqahtany et al. 2017;
Grispos, Storer & Glisson 2013; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Mell & Grance 2011; Ruan et al. 2011; Zhang,
Wang & Han 2014) that the CSPs should cooperate with LEAs to make successful forensic investigations
into cloud computing, as all powers are with the CSPs, and LEAs cannot operate without the cooperation
of the CSPs. Although there is consensus on the importance of CSPs cooperation with LEAs, there is still
no research study to highlight this relationship and identify the factors that need to be understood in
order to enhance and streamline the relationship.
For effective cloud forensic investigations, three main dimensions consisting of seven factors were
proposed as shown in Figure 1. These three dimensions are based on institutional theory, which is
regulative, normative, and cognitive. A detailed discussion of the seven factors (trustworthiness,
segregation of duties, standards, laws and regulations, readiness, accountability, technology
compatibility) is also presented.
Figure 1 illustrates the overlap between the functions of LEAs and CSPs. We note the gap in the middle
of the overlapped area. This gap has been confirmed by some researchers (Almulla, Iraqi & Jones 2014;
Alqahtany et al. 2017; Grispos, Storer & Glisson 2013; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Ruan et al. 2011; Zhang,
Wang & Han 2014).
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Figure 1 Conceptual Framework for a Collaborative Cloud Forensic Investigations
Figure 1 also shows a conceptual framework to analyse the critical factors for the relationship between
CSPs and LEAs. There are seven hypotheses (H1-H7) as given below:
H1: Laws and regulations have a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs.
H2: The segregation of duties has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs.
H3: Accountability has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs.
H4: The SOPs & Standards have a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs.
H5: Readiness has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs.
H6: The trustworthiness of CSPs has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs.
H7: The technology compatibility of CSPs has a critical impact on the relationship with LEAs.

4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For the experimental evaluation of the presented hypotheses and proposed model, we developed a
survey instrument, which is to achieve the correctness and accuracy of the tool, and reduce the
measurement error based on the previous guidelines that have been developed in the literature
(Aladalah, Cheung & Lee 2016; Lewis, Templeton & Byrd 2005; MacKenzie, Podsakoff & Podsakoff 2011;
Moore & Benbasat 1991).
This survey will help to test and confirm the factors suggested in the hypothesis. This will lead to
understand relationship between the LEAs and CSPs. We validated the instrument as summarised in
Table 1.
Phase

Description

Construct
definition

Constructs definition were derived from a variety of sources including pre-existing definitions,
and mostly prior relevant literature reviews.

Item generation

Scales were adopted from relevant literature when possible. Items were developed for other
constructs Appendix 1.

Expertise
Feedback

The draft survey was sent to academic and experts in the field, three senior academic and three
amendments were made to the items. Four expertise from the industry, law enforcement
agency and local cloud service providers.

Q-sorting

Qualtrics Q-sorting was used, where participants were asked to drag and drop random items
inside boxes displaying factors. A two-stage examination was performed to improve reliability
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Phase

Description
and validity. Practical experience has been taken into account and it was that participants
must not have less than 5 years of experience. Also, their educational level must not be less
than master degree for practitioners, and a PhD for academics. Two academics with practical
experience in digital forensics and two experts in digital forensics from industry, two
practitioners at each stage, resulting in modifications in the formulation of several items
(Appendix 1).

Pre-testing

To enhance reliability and validity, two academics completed the initial questionnaire. There
was a slight change in length, structure, wording of the Questionnaire.
7 law enforcement agencies, cloud services providers, academics, professionals in the field
finished the survey. There was a minor change were made based on their feedback.

Pilot test

Table 1. Instrument development process

4.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization
Following to the conceptual definition of the whole constructs, which has been operationalised using
validated items from previous related studies. We then validated the measures and adjusted those items
to fit the LEAs & CSPs relationship context. The scales have been developed for some items by following
the development guidelines using the existing literature (Lewis, Templeton & Byrd 2005). In order to
assure the validity and reliability of the instrument (Neuman 2011), and to verify that the participants
have sufficiently understood the items, multi indicators have been used. Maintaining the short measure
is effective to reduce the response bias caused by boredom or fatigue. Harvey, Billings and Nilan (1985)
recommended to evaluate the homogeneity of items at each latent construct, which requires at least four
items for each scale. The final survey consists of four items or more to all factors. The final measures are
given in Appendix 1.

4.2 Q-sorting
Q-Sorting is one technique utilised to evaluate the reliability and validity of survey measurements
developed for the questionnaire (Nahm et al. 2002). The goal of the Q-sorting is to test the items
empirically to decide whether each item in the survey represents the corresponding factor (Lewis,
Templeton & Byrd 2005). The method involves two different stages, each stage consisted of different
pairs of judges. Two participants were digital forensics academics, other two were digital forensics
experts from the industry. Participants were grouped in pairs, an academic and a practitioner in each
round. Judges were not allowed to any cooperation among them. On the other hand, they have the right
to ask anything relevant to the Q-sorting procedures (Brown 1996). To evaluate and assess the
measurement validity and reliability, the inter-judge agreement level was calculated by Cohen’s Kappa
Index (Cohen 1960) and the hit ratio (Moore & Benbasat 1991), both have been used as evaluation
criteria in order to evaluate the measurement reliability and validity. Regarding Kappa, there are no
general agreement exists, but several scholars recommended the following: rates from (.76 -1.00) are
considered to be excellent agreement, rates from (.40 - .75) are considered to be fair to moderate
agreement, and rates from (.39 or less) are considered poor agreement (Landis & Koch 1977). According
to hit ratio, the higher the percentage of items placed in the correct construct, the higher the degree of
the inter-judge agreement occurred.

Theoretical

Actual
Construct

1

1

11

2

1

2

3

4

5

1

1

10

1

3

11

1

4

1

7

5

1

6

1

7

1

Total items placement:

6

7

1

N/A

Total

Hits

1

14

79%

1

14

71%

2
9

Number of
hits:

79%

8

88%

1

1

12

75%

6

1

8

75%

8

88%

7
78

14

61

79%

Overall hit ratio:

Table 2. First sorting stage
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In the first stage, a pool of 39 items was presented randomly, and each judge was present with 7 factors
and 39 items and was asked to drag and drop them into the factor boxes. “Not Applicable” box has been
added to guarantee the judges’ freedom to decide, thereby not pushing them into a particular box. In
this round, two judges agreed on 32 out of 39 items; an average “hit ratio” of 79 percent was attained as
61 out of 78 items were correctly classified as shown in Table 2. The first sorting round resulted in a
rewording of the ambiguous items, and also the deletion of undetermined items. Exactly 3 items have
been deleted, and 6 items have been reworded. Table 3 presents the round 2 of the Q-sorting.

Theoretical

Actual
Construct

1

1

10

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

N/A

13

3

10

1

4

1

7

5

1
9

6
Number of hits:

100%

14

93%

12

90%

8

88%

10

90%

8

8

100%

8

100%

8
70

Hits

10

1

7
Total items placement:

Total

65

93%

Overall hit ratio:

Table 3. Second sorting stage
The phase two of Q-sorting presented 35 items for the constructs. Two judges agreed on 33 out of the 35
items with a hit ratio of 93 percent, almost 14 percentage improvement compared to phase one, as 65 of
70 items were accurately categorised as shown in Table 3. Whereas, the calculated Kappas yielded values
is above 0.90. Following Landis and Koch (1977) guidelines for acceptable levels for Cohen’s Kappa
Index, which is considered above 0.76 as an excellent agreement level, we decided to end the Q-Sorting,
with average placement ratio of 93%, which confirmed a high level of reliability and construct validity.
Overall, the methods utilised are deemed as adequate in meeting the content validity, and the
instrument is ready for the next phase.

4.3 Pilot test
The goal of this phase is to evaluate the items and the general format. As the final sample for this research
is limited to Omani expertise in the field, this phase involved 8 digital forensics expertise, cloud servers
providers and academics researchers. Pilot test participants were asked to fill the survey and then gives
feedback on the level of difficulty in completing the survey. The survey investigated the proposed model
constructs on a 5 point Likert (1932) started from ‘Very Important’ to ‘Not at all important’. Moreover,
the pilot test participants have been asked to gives their suggestions for any improvement. The final
outcome of this phase has improved the quality of the survey, and presented to the final draft of the
survey.

5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
5.1 Initial reliability
In order to evaluate the initial reliability of the instrument, we calculate the Barlett’s Test of Sphericity
and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. The correlation matrix unveiled the
presence of several coefficients as 0.3 and above. This was considered high enough to guarantee that the
engaged items were adequate measures of the factors. The rate of Bartlett's test of sphericity is
statistically significant (p-value <.000) fortifying the statistical correlation between the abovementioned variables. Those measures show the appropriateness of data for the need for handling factor
analysis and presented evidence of initial reliability.

5.2 Construct validity
Factor validity is revealed by analysing its indicators relationship with other factors, both associated
(i.e., convergent validity) and unassociated (i.e., discriminant validity) (Pallant 2011). Hair et al. (2006)
suggested that the evidence of convergent validity is confirmed If the indicators load strongly on their
associated constructs (p>.50). In addition, the factors must be tested in order to discriminant validity,
which could be achieved if the indicators are different from other unassociated indicators and load
stronger on their associated factors than on any other factors. Items which have loadings under the
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threshold must be dropped from the final instrument. Moreover, items loading on multiple factors must
be dropped also. Nonetheless, Lewis, Templeton and Byrd (2005) recommended that subjective
judgement must be applied, so that items with strongly justified theoretical relevance are not lost in the
process. essential element analysis with Varimax rotation has been used to evaluate the validity of the
instrument. The final instrument of 33 items representing 7 separate factors which have been tested in
order to check the robustness of the measurement. The factor analysis showed a logical grouping with
the identified constructs, ensuring the accuracy of the proposed constructs. All the 33 items have
loadings on their related constructs over the cut-off of 0.50, thereby confirming convergent validity.
Furthermore, all items load stronger on their associated construct than on other constructs, suggesting
good discriminant validity. Thus, the outcomes show that factors can be applied to evaluate the
conceptual research model and hypotheses.

5.3 Final reliability
According to Hair et al. (2006), Cronbach’s alpha is commonly used to measure the reliability with a
range from 0 (totally unreliable) to 1 (completely reliable). An alpha statistic of 0.60 to 0.70 is considered
to be the lower limit of acceptability and sufficient for exploratory research, but 0.8 or higher is
inevitably more desirable, and beyond .90 could pose a problem of multicollinearity(Nunnally &
Bernstein 1967). The reliability test has been conducted during the pilot study data to evaluate the
internal consistency of every group of items for each factor. The reliability function of the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) has been used to calculate Cronbach’s alpha. The outcomes
present that the reliability of the factors range from .79 to .93, which shows statistically significant
results because they fall within the recommended rates. Consequently, factor reliabilities are considered
to be sufficient.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This research seeks to study the challenges of cloud forensics and to highlight the relationship between
Omani LEAs and Local CSPs. A wide range of existing research in CFR has a framework and prototype
for solutions was quantified. However, as previous literature has shown, there is a knowledge gap in the
relationship between the CSPs and LEAs in cloud forensics from a legal and technical perspective, the
research highlights the importance of this relationship in order to achieve a high level of readiness,
segregation of duties and responsibility.
To achieve the objectives, the researcher will use an interpretive qualitative case study approach, and
the relationship between the CSPs and LEAs will be investigated. This research is expected to contribute
to the body of knowledge of cloud forensics as the development of new theory, and a practical
contribution is expected, where new insights and vision to decision and policymakers, CSPs and LEAs
to improve this relationship.
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Appendix 1 : List of measurement items
Construct

SOPs & Standards

No
SS1

Survey Items
Procedures, model or framework for cloud forensic investigations.

SS2

best practices for cloud forensic investigations

SS3

A guideline on cooperation between CSPs and LEAs, in cases of an
cloud forensics investigation.

SS4

An agreement on the recording of the chain of custody among all
parties in an investigation.
An agreement and guideline on preparing cloud forensic reports to
ensure standard format.
Cloud forensic readiness with LEAs.
Cloud forensic readiness with CSPs.
Conducting plans and possible scenarios,

SS5
R1
R2
R3
Readiness

R4
R5
R6
A1
A2

Accountability

A3
A4
A5
SD1
SD2

Segregation of
Duties

SD3
SD4
LR1
LR2
LR3

Laws & Regulations
LR4
LR5
T1

Trustworthiness

T2
T3
T4
TC1

Cloud forensics
technology
compatibility

TC2
TC3
TC4

Test and verify tools (hardware and software) used in cloud forensics
investigations.
A policy in the CSPs to reinforce the proactive cloud forensics and
ensure all procedures are performed in a standard fashion.
Digital forensics staff in the LEAs provided with up-to-date training on
cloud forensic knowledge.
Accountability of organisations actions and roles in cloud forensics
investigations.
Accountability of individuals' actions and roles towards cloud forensics
investigations.
The enforcement of cloud forensics investigations standards and
procedures across the organization
The appropriateness of specific sanctions in violating cloud forensics
investigations standards
Severity of violation of the Cloud Forensics investigations (Legal
damages, consequences, etc.)
An agreement on the division of responsibilities
Segregation of duties to avoid the conflict of interest and overlap
between the functions of LEAs and CSPs.
Understand ability and clarity of the cloud forensics investigations
Standards and procedures
The clarity of employees’ roles and responsibilities towards cloud
forensics investigations
Laws or regulations governing the work of cloud service providers
CSP.
Laws or regulations cover aspects of Cloud Forensics investigations.
Service Level Agreement (SLA), should be covering the cloud forensics
terms such as tools, supported technologies, and access granted
regarding forensic investigation.
Encourage and participate in international conventions to facilitate
access to an exchange of evidence during cloud forensics investigations
with International level.
Consult the legal experts in CSPs or externally, in multi-jurisdiction/
multi-tenant cases in relation to forensic investigations.
The Team of the first responder at CSPs should be well trained and
certified in cloud forensics on how to handle and maintain digital
evidence?
Continuity of business and services are the top priorities for CSPs
Functionality of digital forensics in satisfying the cloud forensics
investigations requirements
Users’ confidence of maintain evidence integrity in CSPs
The appropriateness of technical requirements for satisfying cloud
forensic standards
Standardization of cloud forensic technologies
Interoperability of cloud forensic technologies with operational
technologies
Perceived impact in terms of technical burdens and cost
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(Al-Kalbani 2017)
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